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INTRODUCTION 
During 2004, the Federal Circuit issued few trademark decisions of note, 
as the court resolved the issues it faced principally on the basis of long-
standing Federal Circuit and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) 
precedent. 
One case of interest, In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP,1 presented the issue 
of the impact the presence of a top level Internet domain name—”.com” in 
this instance—has on the registrability of the mark.  The Federal Circuit 
held that top level domain names generally do not render an otherwise 
generic or descriptive mark registrable, but did not rule out an analysis of 
the meaning of the “.com” element of the mark that might make the mark 
as a whole protectable.2  This would particularly be the case where the top 
level domain name does not communicate that the applicable goods or 
services are being offered through the Internet, but rather imparts a 
different meaning altogether.3 
Shen Mfg. Co. v. The Ritz Hotel4 presented an interesting factual scenario 
under which appellant Shen, the opposer below, has used the mark RITZ 
since 1892 on kitchen textiles such as dish towels, ironing board covers, 
and similar items.5  Cross-appellee-applicant has owned and operated the 
world famous The Ritz Hotel in Paris since 1898.  The controversy itself 
took twenty years to resolve, as the dispute had languished at the Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) as a result of party inaction.  In reaching 
the disputed issues, the Federal Circuit undertook a thorough and useful 
discussion of the DuPont6 relatedness-of-the-goods factor, specifically 
                                                          
 1. 373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 2. Id. at 1176 (affirming the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s 
determination after de novo review in which the mark “Patents.com” was held to be merely 
descriptive). 
 3. Id. at 1173-74. 
 4. 393 F.3d 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 5. Id. at 1239. 
 6. The DuPont factors are used in the Federal Circuit to analyze whether a likelihood 
of confusion exists between two marks.  These are: 
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, 
sound connotation and commercial impression.  (2) The similarity or dissimilarity 
and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration or 
in connection with which a prior mark is in use.  (3) The similarity or dissimilarity 
of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.  (4) The conditions under which 
and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated 
purchasing.  (5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).  (6) 
The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.  (7) The nature 
and extent of any actual confusion.  (8) The length of time during and conditions 
under which there had been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.  
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, ‘family’ 
mark, product mark. . .) (10) The market interface between applicant and the owner 
of a prior mark . . . (11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others 
from use of its mark on its goods.  (12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., 
whether de minimus or substantial.  (13) Any other established fact probative of the 
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addressing whether goods are sufficiently unrelated so that identical marks 
may co-exist. 
Of a total of thirteen opinions on trademark issues in 2004, seven were 
substantive7 and six were procedural.8  All six of the procedural opinions 
were affirmances of TTAB decisions and are not citable as precedent.  Two 
of these procedural opinions were issued per curiam.9  This strongly 
suggests that the Federal Circuit believes that the TTAB should have wide 
latitude in managing its docket, and that TTAB litigants would be well 
advised to pay careful attention to procedural rules and rulings. 
Of the thirteen, only two cases were appeals from district court 
decisions,10 and while one was a reversal in part,11 the rest were all 
affirmances.12 
I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A. Likelihood of Confusion 
1. Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.13 
The Nautilus Group case came to the Federal Circuit on an interlocutory 
                                                          
effect of use. 
In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973), cited in In re 
Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 7. Shen Mfg. Co., 393 F.3d at 1238; Cross Country Bank v. Cross Country Fin. Corp., 
No. 04-1371, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26725 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2004); In re DSS Envtl., 
Inc., No. 04-1041, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21994 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 20, 2004); In re Chatam 
Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d at 1340; In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d at 1171; Nautilus 
Group, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Payday Garden 
City, LLC v. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of America, No. 03-1359, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3100 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2004). 
 8. Detroit Entm’t, LLC v. Motor Cities Casinos, LLC, No. 04-1218, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22580 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 12, 2004); Stoller v. Ponce, No. 04-1305, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22208 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2004); Osmosis Tech. Inc. v. GE Osmonics, Inc., No. 04-
1407, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 19411 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2004); Leoutsakos v. Coll’s Hosp. 
Pharm., Inc., No. 03-1533, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8774 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2004); Central 
Mfg. v. Surgical Navigation Tech., Inc., No. 03-1414, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 5033 (Fed. 
Cir. Mar. 17, 2004); Mattel, Inc. v. Henson, No. 03-1360, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1596 
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 3, 2004). 
 9. Detroit Entm’t, LLC, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22580; Mattel, Inc., 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 1596. 
 10. Leoutsakos, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8774; Nautilus Group, Inc., 372 F.3d at 1330. 
 11. Shen Mfg. Co., 393 F.3d at 1246. 
 12. In re DSS Envtl., Inc., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21994; Cross Country Bank, 2004 
U.S. App. LEXIS 26725; Detroit Entm’t, LLC, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22580; Stoller, 2004 
U.S. App. LEXIS 22208; Osmosis Tech. Inc., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 19411; Leoutsakos, 
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8774; In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d at 1332; In re Oppedahl & 
Larson LLP, 373 F.3d at 1171; Nautilus Group, Inc., 372 F.3d at 1330; Central Mfg., 2004 
U.S. App. LEXIS 5033; Payday Garden City, LLC, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3100; Mattel, 
Inc., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1596. 
 13. 372 F.3d at 1330. 
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appeal from the District Court of the Western District of Washington.14  
Applying Ninth Circuit standards, the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial 
court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to plaintiff Nautilus, finding that 
the district court had not abused its discretion.15 
Plaintiff Nautilus, an exercise equipment manufacturer, owns the 
trademark BOWFLEX, registered in 1986 and used since 1984, on the 
Bowflex Exerciser, a resistance training system.16  The system uses vertical 
bendable rods which “bow” outward when the resistance cable is pulled.17  
In addition, Nautilus holds two patents covering the technology for the 
Bowflex product.18 
Another exercise equipment manufacturer, defendant Icon, introduced a 
competing resistance training system in 2002, called the CROSSBOW.19  
Icon’s system uses horizontal bendable rods that bend outward, resembling 
a medieval crossbow weapon.20  In Icon’s mark, the “O” in CROSSBOW 
was represented by circular crosshairs and beneath the word mark was the 
line “by Weider.”  Both companies advertised their equipment in similar 
channels, such as infomercials and the Internet.21 
After reviewing the standards for granting a preliminary injunction,22 the 
Federal Circuit outlined the often-cited Sleekcraft factors, the Ninth 
Circuit’s rendition of the digits of confusion.23  The court’s opinion 
principally focused on four of the confusion factors:  intent to confuse, 
evidence of actual confusion, the strength of Nautilus’s mark, and the 
similarity of the marks.24 
In analyzing the intent to confuse factor, the Federal Circuit noted that 
intent can be inferred when a similar mark is adopted by a defendant who 
                                                          
 14. Federal Circuit jurisdiction was predicated on patent infringement claims in the 
lawsuit.  Id. at 1334. 
 15. Id. at 1330, 1332, 1333-34. 
 16. Id. at 1332-33. 
 17. Id. at 1332. 
 18. Id. at 1333. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Under Ninth Circuit case law, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 
demonstrate either probable success on the merits of the case and the possibility of 
irreparable injury, or the existence of serious questions on the merits of the case and that the 
balance of hardships tips in its favor.  Id. at 1334 (citing GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney 
Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 23. The Sleekcraft factors, as outlined by the Federal Circuit, are: 
(1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness or proximity of the two 
companies’ products or services, (3) the strength of the registered mark, (4) the 
marketing channels used, (5) the degree of care likely to be exercised by the 
purchaser in selecting goods, (6) the accused infringers’ intent in selecting the 
mark, (6) the accused infringers’ intent in selecting the mark, (7) evidence of actual 
confusion, and (8) the likelihood of expansion in product lines. 
Id. at 1335 (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
 24. Id. at 1334-36. 
  
2005] TRADEMARK SUMMARY 1185 
has “actual or constructive knowledge of the plaintiff’s mark,”25 but that 
this factor is accorded minimal importance when considering the Sleekcraft 
factors together.26  Icon contended that the choice to use the word “bow” in 
its mark was not to capitalize on the BOWFLEX fame but because of the 
resemblance of the shape of their machine to a crossbow.27  In support, 
Icon pointed to the differences in the marks, such as the “by Weider” 
source designation.28  The Federal Circuit, agreeing that the district court’s 
findings on this issue were conclusory and not sufficiently specific, 
ultimately discounted this factor.29 
Regarding evidence of the actual confusion factor, the Federal Circuit 
again agreed with Icon that Nautilus’s evidence was unreliable because the 
specific incidents of confusion could have been attributable to product 
similarity, not mark similarity.30  The court consequently decided not to 
weigh this factor in favor of either party.31 
Icon also challenged the district court’s finding that BOWFLEX was a 
strong mark.  Icon argued that the mark BOWFLEX lacked distinction 
because the word “bow” was either generic or descriptive and therefore 
entitled to less protection.32  The trial court held that Nautilus’s mark was 
suggestive, not descriptive, because the consumer had to make a mental 
leap between the word mark and the product image.33  Additionally, the 
trial court found that Nautilus’s twenty-year investment in marketing and 
advertising its mark resulted in substantial market strength.  Given the 
strong evidence of brand recognition, the Federal Circuit did not find any 
error in these determinations.34 
Next, the Federal Circuit addressed Icon’s contentions regarding the 
district court’s analysis of the similarity of the marks.  The district court 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 1337 (citing Brookfield Communications Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 
F.3d 1036, 1059 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1336. 
 29. Id. at 1336-37. 
 30. In the district court, Nautilus had submitted the transcripts of four phone calls made 
to its customer service center as evidence of actual confusion.  Id. at 1337.  Icon challenged 
the evidence on two grounds:  first, that four calls out of thousands were too few to be 
sufficient for a showing of actual confusion, and second, that the transcript of the calls 
indicate confusion stemming from the similarity of the products, not the trademarks.  Id. at 
1338.  Upon reviewing the transcripts, the court noted that in each one, the caller either was 
confused by the similarity of the machines or knew the difference between the two 
companies and thus the submitted evidence was not indicative of actual trademark 
confusion.  Id. at 1339 n.6. 
 31. Id. at 1337-39. 
 32. Id. at 1341. 
 33. Id. at 1343.  The difference between whether a mark is suggestive or descriptive 
turns on how “immediate and direct . . . the thought process [is] from the mark to the 
particular product.”  Id. at 1340. 
 34. Id. at 1340-43. 
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had determined that the two marks, BOWFLEX and CROSSBOW, were 
“only somewhat similar” because the meaning, appearance, and sound of 
the marks were different.35  However, because the products were identical, 
the district court found this sufficient to weigh the factor in favor of 
Nautilus.36  Icon contended that if the meaning, appearance, and sound of 
the marks are different, the finding should be that the marks are not similar.  
Icon also contended that the evaluation of the marks should focus on the 
words “flex” and “cross” separately rather than the mark as a whole.37  The 
Federal Circuit agreed with Icon only to the extent that likelihood of 
confusion cannot be found without the marks being similar, but disagreed 
that the district court had erred on this factor.38 
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit declined to evaluate the 
marks in their components, stating that marks should be compared in their 
entirety.  Because the marks share the word “bow,” the court concluded 
that they were “at least somewhat similar.”39  Although the Federal Circuit 
did not cite the “anti-dissection” rule in this analysis, that principle is well-
established in both the Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.40 
Icon also made the novel argument that when a court determines that two 
marks are similar, it must, in order to find a likelihood of confusion, also 
find a causal link between the similarity of the marks and any confusion.  
This argument was rejected summarily as not a part of a digits-of-confusion 
analysis.41 
Even though it discounted the intent-to-infringe and evidence-of-actual 
confusion factors, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was enough 
evidence to sustain the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction, 
specifically the similarity of the marks, the proximity of the products and 
services, the strength of the BOWFLEX mark, and the similarity of 
marketing channels used by both parties.42  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit 
reasoned that even though the similarity of the marks was weak, this 
weakness was offset by the strength of the other factors, and given the 
limited scope of review, there was no basis to find that the district court had 
abused its discretion.43 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 1343. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1344. 
 38. Id. at 1343-45. 
 39. Id. at 1345. 
 40. See Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Churchfield Publ., Inc., 6 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (“[U]nder the anti-dissection rule, the validity and distinctiveness of a composite 
trademark is determined by viewing the trademark as a whole, as it appears in the 
marketplace.”).  The Federal Circuit’s anti-dissection rule is discussed in case summaries 
following this one. 
 41. Nautilus Group, Inc., 372 F.3d at 1343-44. 
 42. Id. at 1346. 
 43. Id. 
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2. In re Chatam International Inc.44 
This case came before the Federal Circuit on an appeal from the TTAB’s 
refusal to register a mark because of the likelihood of confusion between 
appellant Chatam’s proposed mark and a prior registration.45  Applying the 
substantial-evidence standard of review, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
Board’s determination.46 
In 2000 Chatam filed an intent-to-use application with the PTO for the 
mark JOSE GASPAR GOLD for a tequila brand.47  The PTO examining 
attorney refused registration on the basis that there was a likelihood of 
confusion with the registered mark GASPAR ALE.48  In coming to this 
conclusion, the examiner noted that GASPAR was the dominant feature of 
both parties’ mark.49 
Chatam responded by contending that ale and tequila were two different 
classes of goods and challenged the examiner’s conclusion that the word 
GASPAR was the dominant feature of the marks.50  The examiner denied 
the response, reasserting that GASPAR was the dominant feature of the 
marks and that “tequila or liquor and beer or ale enjoy a close 
relationship.”51  Chatam appealed, and the Board affirmed the examiner’s 
refusal based on two factors of the DuPont test:  similarity of the marks, 
and similarity of the goods in a commercial sense.52  The Board also noted 
that any doubt is resolved against the newcomer because of the newcomer’s 
obligation and opportunity to avoid using a confusing mark.53 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first noted that whether a likelihood of 
confusion exists is a legal question the Federal Circuit reviews without 
deference, whereas the factual findings underpinning the legal conclusion 
are reviewed under the standard of “substantial evidence.”54  The Federal 
Circuit focused its analysis on the same two factors as the Board, namely 
similarity of the respective marks and goods.55 
Chatam argued on appeal that the words JOSE, GOLD, and ALE as 
additions to the marks result in different commercial impressions, and that 
the Board improperly dissected the marks to support its finding of 
                                                          
 44. 380 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 45. Id. at 1341. 
 46. Id. at 1342. 
 47. Id. at 1341. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1342. 
 53. Id.  
 54. “Evidence is substantial if ‘a reasonable person might find that the evidentiary 
record supports the agency’s conclusion.’”  Id. (quoting On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 55. Id. at 1343-44. 
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similarity.56  In addressing this argument, the Federal Circuit acknowledged 
the anti-dissection rule, that “a likelihood of confusion ‘cannot be 
predicated on . . . only part of a mark’”57 but also pointed out that “it is not 
improper to state that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been 
given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion 
rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties.”58  In applying 
these principles, the Federal Circuit found that the Board properly came to 
its determination that the marks convey the same commercial impression, 
namely that “a name GASPAR is the source of related alcoholic beverages, 
tequila and beer or ale.”59 
The Board discounted the commercial significance of the word ALE 
because it was disclaimed in the registration.60  The Board also discounted 
the commercial significance of the words JOSE and GOLD.61 It found that 
JOSE reinforces the impression that GASPAR is a name rather than 
distinguishing it from GASPAR.62  GOLD denotes a descriptive term of 
quality, also not offering appreciable differentiation in commercial 
impression between the two marks.  As the Federal Circuit stated, “viewed 
in their entireties with non-dominant features appropriately discounted, the 
marks [‘Gaspar’ and ‘Gaspar’s’] become nearly identical.”63 
With respect to the second consideration, relatedness of the goods, the 
Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s 
determination that there is a close relationship between tequila and beer or 
ale.  The court explained that the source of these goods are frequently the 
same, they are marketed in many of the same channels, they are marketed 
to the same consumers, and they are inexpensive commodities which 
customers would not be able to distinguish by manufacturer.64 
In reaching this determination, the Federal Circuit cited In re Majestic 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 1343-44.  In re Chatam International Inc. relied on In re Hearst Corp., 982 
F.2d 493 (Fed. Cir. 1992), where the Federal Circuit had found that VARGA GIRL and 
VARGA were not confusingly similar as used for calendars, and Conde Nast Publications, 
Inc. v. Miss Quality, Inc., 507 F.2d 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1975), where the Federal Circuit’s 
predecessor found COUNTRY VOGUES for women’s dresses and VOGUE for a women’s 
magazine were not confusingly similar.  380 F.3d at 1343-44.  Here, the court distinguished 
these two cases by stating that they were not controlling for the TTAB because the Board 
“neither inappropriately changed the marks, nor erroneously determined that the marks were 
similar after viewing the marks as a whole, though focusing on their dominant features,” 
which was the case in both In re Hearst Corp. and Conde Nast.  Id. at 1344. 
 57. Id. at 1342 (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 58. Id. (quoting Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000)). 
 59. Id. at 1342. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1343. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1344-45. 
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Distilling Co.65 for the proposition that beer and tequila are closely related 
products because they are both alcoholic beverages and both marketed in 
the same trade channels.  In that case, the Federal Circuit reached the same 
determination when comparing malt liquor with tequila.66 
Concluding its opinion, the Federal Circuit approved the Board’s 
analysis of comparing the marks in their entirety but giving each term more 
or less weight depending on “its effect on the overall commercial 
impression.”67 
3. Shen Mfg. Co. v. The Ritz Hotel68 
On appeal from the TTAB, the Federal Circuit in Shen affirmed the 
Board’s decision in part and reversed in part, in effect finding that no 
likelihood of confusion existed between the parties for any of the marks at 
issue, including identical marks.69  Applicant The Ritz Hotel (“RHL”) has 
owned and operated The Ritz Hotel in Paris, France since 1898.70  RHL 
owns the trademarks RITZ, RITZ PARIS RITZ HOTEL, and HOTEL 
RITZ in connection with hotel and restaurant services, as well as for the 
“sale of coffee, tea, chocolates, drinking glasses and champagne.”71  
Opposer Shen owns the mark RITZ for use in connection with the sale of 
“kitchen textiles, such as dish towels, potholders, and aprons”72 as well as 
other textile items such as “bathroom towels and ironing board covers.”73  
Shen has used the RITZ mark since 1892.74 
In 1984 and 1985 RHL attempted to register the following five marks: 
(1) PUTTING ON THE RITZ for shower curtains; (2) RITZ PARIS 
RITZ HOTEL and design for ‘dinner plates of porcelain or earthenware, 
cups, saucers and serving pieces of porcelain, hair combs, household 
sponges, household brushes, steelwool, [and] household glassware’; (3) 
RITZ PARIS RITZ HOTEL and design for ‘carpets, rugs, floor mats and 
                                                          
 65. 315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 66. Id. at 1316.  In Guinness United Distillers & Vintners B.V. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 
64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1039, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction to Guinness against Anheuser’s use of “Red Label” for high end beer, as likely to 
cause confusion with the Guinness “Red Label” scotch product.  The court stated that while 
scotch whiskey and beer are different products even though both are alcoholic and sold in 
the same channels of trade, the existence of flavored alcoholic beverages (“FABs”) has 
“narrowed the gap between these two segments of the alcoholic beverage market.”  Id. at 
1043.  This decision was not cited in either In re Majestic Distilling Co. or In re Chatam 
International Inc.. 
 67. In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d at 1345. 
 68. 393 F.3d 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 69. Id. at 1245-46. 
 70. Id. at 1239. 
 71. Id. at 1240. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  The mark was derived from founder John Ritzenthaler’s last name.  Id. 
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matting, linoleum for covering existing floors [and] wall covering made of 
vinyl and plastic’; (4) RITZ for cooking and wine selection classes; and (5) 
THE RITZ KIDS for ready made and tailored clothing, including 
underwear, dresses, skirts, trousers, shirts, neckties, belts, gloves, hats, 
raincoats and galoshes.75 
Shen opposed these applications on the basis that they would likely 
cause confusion with its trademark.76  The Board dismissed Shen’s 
opposition with respect to PUTTING ON THE RITZ for shower curtains 
and RITZ PARIS RITZ HOTEL and design for dinnerware and floor and 
wall coverings.77  However, with respect to Shen’s opposition to RITZ for 
cooking and wine selection classes and THE RITZ KIDS for children’s 
apparel, the Board sustained Shen’s objection.78 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit’s opinion focused on three of the DuPont 
factors:  (1) alleged fame of the RITZ mark, (2) the similarity of the marks, 
and (3) the relatedness of the goods at issue.79  First, the Federal Circuit 
found that Shen’s mark was not famous because the evidence presented did 
not indicate that the mark enjoyed “‘extensive public recognition and 
renown’ characteristic of a famous mark.”80  Next, the Federal Circuit 
analyzed each set of marks in turn with respect to the remaining two 
factors, similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s determination that PUTTING 
ON THE RITZ for shower curtains was not likely to be confused with 
RITZ for bathroom towels because while the goods are related, the marks 
are not similar.81  The commercial impression of PUTTING ON THE RITZ 
is “specifically that of getting dressed up or of the song composed by Irving 
Berlin”82 which is significantly different from RITZ.83  Shen, however, 
argued that the PUTTING ON THE segment of the mark was insignificant, 
making RITZ the only relevant part and as such, identical to Shen’s RITZ 
mark.84 
Relying again on its anti-dissection rule, the Federal Circuit admonished 
that the mark must be viewed in its entirety and found that when evaluated 
as a whole, PUTTING ON THE RITZ conveyed an image of “comfort, 
sophistication and wealth”85 that was different from the commercial 
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 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1242. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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impression that Shen’s mark gave, that of cooking or manual labor, because 
of its use in connection with kitchen textiles.86  The Federal Circuit also 
noted that the two marks are different in sound and appearance.87 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Board’s determination that there 
was no likelihood of confusion between RITZ PARIS RITZ HOTEL and 
design for dinnerware and floor and wall coverings and RITZ for kitchen 
textiles.88  Shen argued on appeal that the Board gave too much weight to 
PARIS and HOTEL which are disclaimed in RHL’s registration.89  
However, the Federal Circuit found that the disclaimed elements of a mark 
are relevant to the similarity assessment because the analysis is viewed 
from the perspective of the consumer who is unaware of whether a word is 
disclaimed.90  While there is some relatedness of goods between RHL’s 
dinnerware and Shen’s kitchen textiles, the Federal Circuit found that the 
marks were not similar in commercial impression, sound, or appearance.91 
Finally the Federal Circuit assessed the Board’s determination that 
RHL’s registration of RITZ for cooking and wine selection classes and 
THE RITZ KIDS for children’s apparel were confusingly similar, and 
reversed the Board’s decision.  The Federal Circuit found that while RITZ 
and RITZ were similar, the goods were not related.92  Though kitchen 
textiles may be used in a cooking class, the test for relatedness is not 
whether the goods are used together but rather whether the goods “can be 
related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”93  
Here, the Federal Circuit found that the consuming public would not 
believe that these two products would be from the same source.94 
As to RHL’s registration for THE RITZ KIDS, the Federal Circuit found 
that the marks were not similar and that the goods were unrelated.95  
According to the Federal Circuit, the Board improperly dissected the mark 
THE RITZ KIDS to find it similar to RITZ.  The Federal Circuit opined 
                                                          
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1242-43. 
 88. Id. at 1244. 
 89. Id. at 1243. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1243-44. 
 92. Id. at 1244-45. 
 93. Id. at 1245 (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 
1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 94. Id. at 1244.  The court analogized kitchen textiles and cooking classes to its prior 
holding in In re Coors, 343 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003), where beer and restaurant 
services were found unrelated even though both could be found in the same place.  Shen, 
393 F.3d at 1244. 
 95. In finding the goods were related, the Board specifically noted that gloves were 
similar to mitts.  Id. at 1245.  The Federal Circuit noted that this determination was 
erroneous, explaining that while both can be used to cover the hand, this is not relevant to 
the inquiry of whether a consumer could believe that the two products emanated from the 
same source.  The court bolstered its explanation by distinguishing hard hats from fedoras.  
Id. 
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that even though the word THE and KIDS usually have little impact on 
consumers, in this situation the word THE has “elevated significance 
because of the well-known manner in which people refer to RHL as ‘The 
Ritz’ or ‘The Ritz Hotel’ but not as ‘Ritz’ or ‘Ritz Hotel.’”96  As for KIDS, 
the Federal Circuit found that it served to further distinguish RHL’s mark 
from Shen’s.  Additionally, the pronunciation of THE RITZ KIDS 
conveyed an impression of “wealth, a concept tied strongly to RHL and not 
associated in any way with Shen’s RITZ mark.”97 
B. Descriptiveness 
1. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP98 
Oppedahl involved an appeal from the TTAB in which the Federal 
Circuit was asked to reconsider its anti-dissection policy with regard to 
marks using a Top Level Domain name (“TLD”).99  The court affirmed the 
Board’s conclusion that appellant Oppedahl’s proposed mark 
(“Patents.com”) was descriptive and therefore unregistrable.  Oppedahl had 
filed an intent-to-use application for the mark in connection with 
“computer software for managing a database of records and for tracking the 
status of the records by means of the Internet.”100  The PTO refused the 
registration, finding that the mark was merely descriptive of the service.  
The Board affirmed the rejection, in part because the “.com” part of the 
mark held no trademark significance and therefore could not make an 
otherwise descriptive or generic mark registrable.101 
On appeal, Oppedahl challenged the Board’s disregard of the TLD in 
evaluating whether the mark was distinctive.  The Federal Circuit first 
stated that the determination of whether a mark is generic, descriptive, 
suggestive, fanciful, or arbitrary is a question of fact, reviewed under the 
substantial evidence standard.102 
Next, the Federal Circuit reviewed the Trademark Manual of Examining 
Procedure (“TMEP”), which states that “[b]ecause TLDs generally serve 
no source-indicating function, their addition to an otherwise unregistrable 
mark typically cannot render it registerable.”103  Oppedahl argued that the 
Board dissected the TLD from its mark before evaluating its entire 
                                                          
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1172-73. 
 102. Id. at 1173-74. 
 103. Id. at 1174 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1209.03(m) (3rd ed. 2003)). 
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commercial impression.104  The Federal Circuit clarified that while a mark 
should be considered in its entirety, that did not prohibit the Board from 
ascertaining the meaning of the components of a mark and weighing those 
individual components in determining the mark’s overall impression.105  
Additionally, the Federal Circuit analyzed the TMEP rule and stated that 
the language of the rule was not a bright line prohibition against TLDs, but 
instead left room for the possibility that under certain circumstances a TLD 
could provide source-indicating information.106  In this instance, however, 
that exceptional case was not present. 
To illustrate its reasoning, the Federal Circuit posited two hypotheticals.  
First it discussed “tennis.net,” where a company that sells tennis nets but 
never has any intention of selling its products on the Internet, applies for 
the mark “tennis.net.”107  This mark, a combination of a descriptive term 
and a TLD, is in fact distinctive.  The TLD contributes to this characteristic 
because the mark as a whole gives the impression of a “witty double 
entendre” that is “immediately apparent” because the company’s product is 
tennis nets.108  This hypothetical was used to illustrate how a descriptive 
term combined with a TLD can sometimes be distinctive.  Thus, the court 
declined to impose a bright line rule prohibiting TLD’s from ever being 
used to render a mark registerable.109 
The second hypothetical concerned “Amazon.com.”  Oppedahl had 
argued that the word “Amazon” conjured up the area in South America, 
while “Amazon.com” implied the bookseller.110  The Federal Circuit 
responded that this argument was flawed because a mark must be 
considered in context with the goods or services associated with it.111  
                                                          
 104. Appellant cited to In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 
2001), to support its argument that the Board should not have dissected “Patents” and 
“.com” when evaluating its mark.  In re Oppedahl, 373 F.3d at 1174.  The court 
distinguished itself from In re Dial-A-Mattress Corp. by stating that In re Dial-A-Mattress 
Corp. did not say “that the Board cannot ascertain the meaning of each of the words or 
components that make up the entire mark.”  Id.  In In re Dial-A-Mattress Corp., the Board 
had determined that in the mark “1-888-M-A-T-T-R-E-S” the “888” component held no 
source identifying significance, and so analyzed “mattress” on its own.  240 F.3d at 1344.  
“M-A-T-T-R-E-S” by itself was found generic, and in the alternative, descriptive, for 
“telephone shop-at-home retail services in the field of mattresses” and the Board denied 
registration of the mark.  Id. at 1343.  The Federal Circuit found that the Board erred by not 
considering the mark as a whole, and reversed the Board’s determination that the mark was 
generic.  Id. at 1346, 1348.  The Federal Circuit further held that while the Board’s ruling 
that the mark was descriptive was correct, because there was evidence of secondary 
meaning, the mark had acquired distinctiveness and thus was registrable.  Id. at 1348. 
 105. In re Oppendahl, 373 F.3d at 1174. 
 106. Id. at 1174-75. 
 107. Id. at 1175. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1176. 
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According to the Federal Circuit, the statements “I bought this book from 
Amazon” and “I bought this book from Amazon.com” convey the same 
meaning—that a book was purchased from the online book retailer.112  In 
this hypothetical, the “.com” alone does not add source identifying 
significance.  The Federal Circuit did note that because such a composite 
mark has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning, the 
“Amazon.com” mark is registerable.113 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s determination that 
“Patents.com” was merely descriptive of Oppedahl’s service of providing 
patent tracking through use of the Internet.114  The word “Patents” 
describes the patent tracking feature, while the word “.com” conveys that 
the mark is owned or used by a commercial entity in association with the 
Internet.115  Indeed, the Federal Circuit opined that adding “.com” to the 
mark only strengthened the descriptiveness of the mark, in light of the 
identification of goods in Oppedahl’s application:  tracking patent records 
by means of the Internet.116 
In summary, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Oppedahl reaffirmed prior 
legal principles regarding the trademark significance of TLDs.  Although 
including the TLD typically will not add any source-identifying 
significance, Oppedahl teaches that the inherent registrability analysis must 
go further:  it must evaluate a mark using a TLD in its entirety.  Only in 
exceptional circumstances, can a TLD make a mark distinctive enough to 
be registerable.117 
2. In re DSS Environmental, Inc.118 
Appellant DSS appealed from the TTAB’s refusal to register its 
proposed mark DUALSAND on the ground that the term is descriptive.  
The mark was filed in connection with “water and wastewater filters” that 
are used in dual sand filtration systems.119  On appeal, DSS contended that:  
(1) the evidence the Board relied on was not credible or sufficient, (2) its 
own use of the mark was not descriptive, and (3) its list of third-party 
registrations should have been considered, even though DSS failed to 
submit physical copies of them.120  The Federal Circuit concluded that the 
                                                          
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1177. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1176-77. 
 117. Id. at 1177. 
 118. No. 04-1041, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21994, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 20, 2004). 
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 120. Id. at *5-12.  In the proceeding below, the TTAB found the mark DUALSAND 
descriptive based on evidence such as articles from the Internet and two utility patents, 
including one registered to DSS, using the terms “dual sand filters” and “dual sand 
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Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed.121  
The decision is not citable precedent.122 
3. Cross Country Bank v. Cross Country Financial Corp.123 
In this case, the Federal Circuit affirmed, per curiam, the TTAB’s 
determination.124  In the proceedings below, the Board denied opposer 
Cross Country Bank’s motion for reconsideration of its opposition to 
applicant Cross Country Financial Corp.’s registration of the mark CROSS 
COUNTRY FINANCIAL CORP.125  The registration of the mark was for 
the services of “lease-purchase financing and collection of retail installment 
sales contracts and consumer credit transactions.”126  The Board found that 
Cross County Bank was unable to prove priority of use based on first user 
evidence.127  The Board further found that Cross Country Financial Corp.’s 
use of the mark was not descriptive.128 
C. Genericness 
1. Payday Garden City, LLC v. Community Financial Services 
Association of America129 
In Payday, the Federal Circuit, per curiam, affirmed the Board’s 
decision.130  Petitioner Community Financial Services (“CFS”), a national 
trade association representing the “payday advance” industry, filed a 
petition to cancel the registration of the mark PAYDAY ADVANCES, 
registered to respondent Payday Garden.131  Payday Garden’s identification 
of goods stated the mark was used in connection with “cash advances 
without credit checks up to five hundred dollars ($500) for off-the-street 
                                                          
filtration” in reference with the wastewater treatment industry.  Id. at *6.  DSS challenged 
on appeal the accuracy of articles from the Internet as competent evidence but the Federal 
Circuit dismissed this contention, stating that the Board used the articles to ascertain how 
the term is used, not for their accuracy.  Id. at *8-9. 
With respect to the list of third-party registrations, DSS characterized its failure to 
produce physical copies to the Board as “a harmless procedural error” and also challenged 
the Board’s policy as arbitrary and a denial of DSS’s right to due process.  Id. at *11.  The 
court rejected this argument.  Id. at *12. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. No. 04-1371, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26725 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2004). 
 124. Id. 
 125. TTAB Opposition, No. 91114039, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2004), at 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at *10-11. 
 128. Id. 
 129. No. 01-1359, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3100, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2004). 
 130. Id.  The decision of the TTAB is available at 2003 TTAB LEXIS 33, but is not 
citable as precedent. 
 131. 2003 TTAB LEXIS 33, at *2 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2003). 
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customers with their post-dated checks as promissory note[s], and wire 
funds transfers for such customers.”132 
CFS contended that a “payday advance” is a service its members provide 
where the customer pays a flat fee and receives cash for a short period of 
time against his or her next paycheck.133  After the agreed-upon time, 
CFS’s members will deposit the check or return it to the customer if the 
customer repays with cash.  CFS contended that the registration for 
PAYDAY ADVANCES should be cancelled on grounds of genericness.  
CFS argued that its members have been providing payday advances for 
many years, and that they advertised their services nationwide by using the 
phrase “payday advances” in a non-trademark manner.  CFS further argued 
that the public recognized the phrase “payday advance” as a generic term 
for this service.134 
In assessing whether the mark had become or was generic, the Board 
first determined that the relevant public in this instance consisted of 
“persons who currently need or those who might need a short-term advance 
of small amounts of money.”135  Based on the substantial evidence 
submitted by CFS,136 the Board found that the record sufficiently 
demonstrated that the phrase PAYDAY ADVANCES was a generic term 
for the same services provided by CFS’ members, and granted CFS’s 
petition to cancel Payday Garden’s registration.137 
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A. Procedural Defects 
1. Leoutsakos v. Coll’s Hospital Pharm., Inc.138 
This patent and trademark infringement case came to the Federal Circuit 
on appeal from the District Court of New Hampshire.  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant Coll’s 
Hospital Pharmacy without considering plaintiff Leoutsakos’s common law 
                                                          
 132. Id. at *1. 
 133. Id. at *2. 
 134. Id. at *1-3. 
 135. Id. at *14. 
 136. CFS submitted numerous examples where the term “payday advance” is used as a 
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*23.  Payday Gardens did not offer any arguments or other evidence to refute these 
submissions.  Id. at *23. 
 137. Id. at *14, *25.  The Board also noted that Payday Gardens did not take action 
against competitor use of the term PAYDAY ADVANCES except to mail a few cease and 
desist letters.  Id. at *25.  For those that did not agree to desist, Payday Gardens took no 
further action.  Id. 
 138. No. 03-1533, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8774 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2004). 
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trademark infringement claim because the issue had not been properly 
raised below.139 Leoutsakos raised his trademark infringement claim for the 
first time in his motion for partial summary judgment at the district court 
level.140  The issue was not raised in his complaint, nor did Leoutsakos seek 
leave to amend the complaint.141  The opinion is not citable precedent.142 
2. Osmosis Tech. Inc., v. GE Osmonics, Inc.143 
In Osmosis, the Federal Circuit issued an order denying the petition for 
review because appellant Osmosis failed to file an Entry of Appearance 
form by an attorney admitted to the Federal Circuit, and because Osmosis 
failed to file a brief in accordance with Federal Circuit Rule 31(a).144  The 
petition for appeal was dismissed on the grounds that Osmosis had not 
prosecuted according to Federal Circuit rules.145 
In the TTAB proceeding below,146 Osmosis filed a petition to cancel GE 
Osmonics’s registration for the mark OSMMONICS based on both an 
alleged likelihood of confusion with Osmosis’s mark OSMOTIK, and an 
allegation of fraud in obtaining the registration.147  The TTAB denied the 
petition, finding that Osmosis had failed to prove priority of its mark.148  
Neither the Federal Circuit nor the TTAB opinion is citable precedent.149 
3. Stoller v. Ponce150 
Appellant Stoller sought review of the TTAB’s dismissal of his 
opposition to appellee Ponce’s application for STEALTH SHELF; the 
Federal Circuit affirmed.151  The Board dismissed Stoller’s opposition on 
the basis that he lacked standing to oppose.152  After finding his proffered 
evidence inadmissible, the Board determined that Stoller was unable to 
show a “real interest” in the outcome of the proceeding.153  On appeal, 
Stoller argued that the Board’s determination was incorrect, the decision 
violated his right to due process, and one of the administrative judges was 
biased against him.154  The Federal Circuit found that the Board had not 
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abused its discretion, and that Stoller’s other arguments were without merit 
and unsupported.155  The opinion is not citable precedent.156 
B. Discovery 
1. Central Mfg. v. Surgical Navigation Tech., Inc.157 
On appeal from the TTAB, the Federal Circuit ruled that the Board’s 
denial of opposer Central Manufacturing’s third discovery request was not 
an abuse of discretion.158  Petitioner Surgical Navigation Technologies 
(“SNT”) filed an intent-to-use application for the mark STEALTHVIEW, 
in connection with computer hardware and software for “using medical 
scanning information for surgical planning for use in image guided 
surgery.”159  Central opposed the application on the basis of its ownership 
of several STEALTH registrations.160  Central served multiple discovery 
requests with its opposition.  SNT’s response was a motion to dismiss the 
opposition and to stay discovery.  The Board treated SNT’s response as a 
motion for summary judgment.161 
Central filed another discovery motion under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 56(f), which the Board denied, finding the request overbroad.162  
In addition, the Board sanctioned Central for “falsely stating that its 
discovery request was ‘very tailored’ to SNT’s motion to dismiss.”163  
Central made two more attempts to fix its discovery requests.164  On the 
third attempt, the Board denied the motion with prejudice.165  At the same 
time, Central twice filed a motion to amend its Notice of Opposition, which 
the Board twice denied.166  The Board gave Central thirty days to respond 
to SNT’s motion for summary judgment, warning that if it appealed the 
Board’s prior rulings the summary judgment motion could be decided 
during the pendency of those appeals.167  Central then filed an appeal from 
the denial of its motion to amend its Notice of Opposition, and failed to 
respond to SNT’s motion for summary judgment.168  The Board granted 
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 157. No. 03-1414, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 5033 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 17, 2004). 
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SNT’s motion and dismissed Central’s opposition with prejudice.169 
Central’s appeal focused on two points:  (1) the Board’s denial of 
Central’s discovery requests, and (2) the Board’s denial of Central’s 
request to suspend proceedings until the outcome of its appeal.170 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s denial of Central’s discovery 
request, noting that the request simply repeated the previous one.171  The 
Federal Circuit also affirmed the Board’s denial of Central’s motion to 
suspend proceedings until the outcome of the appeal because of the 
substantial deference given to the Board to control its own docket.172  The 
court noted that the Board gave Central notice that the summary judgment 
motion could be decided while the appeal was pending.  This decision is 
not citable precedent.173 
C. Failure to Prosecute 
1. Mattel, Inc. v. Henson174 
Appellant Mattel appealed the TTAB’s dismissal of its opposition for 
failure to prosecute; the Federal Circuit affirmed in a per curiam 
decision.175  In 2001, appellee Henson filed an application for the mark 
GRANDMA SAYS, to which Mattel filed a notice of opposition.176  The 
notice included scheduling dates for discovery between the parties.  Henson 
filed an answer to the opposition on September 12, 2001.  Mattel never 
received a copy, and the TTAB’s copy did not include a certification of 
service.177 
During the scheduled discovery period, Mattel did not conduct any 
discovery, or even check on the status of the case until July 2002.178  At 
that time Mattel learned of Henson’s answer.179  Three weeks after the end 
date for discovery, Mattel’s newly obtained counsel filed a motion to 
reopen the proceeding.180  In response, Henson filed a cross-motion for 
dismissal of the proceeding for failure to prosecute.181  The TTAB granted 
Henson’s motion and denied Mattel’s motion on the basis that Mattel had 
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failed to show excusable neglect sufficient to reopen the proceeding.182 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal of Mattel’s 
opposition to Henson’s failure to prosecute motion.183  The Federal Circuit 
found that Mattel could not properly demonstrate that its neglect was 
excusable under Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick Ass’n.184  Mattel 
failed to meet the second and third factors of the Pioneer test, which relate 
to the length of the delay and the reason for the delay.185  The Federal 
Circuit found that Mattel failed to meet the second factor because, even 
though two months may be a short period of time by itself, the delay was 
too great when added to the extra time a new discovery period would 
take.186  The court found that Mattel did not meet the third factor because 
the issuance of a default is not automatic, and a party is not justified in 
relying on the TTAB to issue one without any action on their part.187  This 
decision is not citable precedent.188 
2. Detroit Entertainment, LLC v. Motor Cities Casinos, LLC189 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, per curiam, the TTAB’s determination.190  
In the proceedings below, the Board granted Motor Cities Casinos’s motion 
to dismiss opposition proceedings instituted by Detroit Entertainment 
because Detroit Entertainment failed to prosecute.  The Board applied the 
excusable neglect standard found in Pioneer Investment Services v. 
Brunswick Ass’n191 and granted applicant Motor Cities Casinos’s motion to 
dismiss opposition proceedings for failure to prosecute.192  The Board 
                                                          
 182. Id. at *4. 
 183. Id. at *1. 
 184. 507 U.S. 380 (1993).  In Mattel, the Court applied factors the Supreme Court set 
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 186. Id. (citing Old Nutfield, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1701-1702). 
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 192. TTAB Opposition, No. 91151905 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2003), at 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ (on file with the American University Law Review). 
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found that the reason for delay was wholly within Detroit Entertainment’s 
control, and thus the third Pioneer factor did not weigh in its favor.193  With 
respect to the second factor, the length of delay, the Board reasoned that the 
delay was significant because of the length of time between the close of the 
discovery period and the filing, briefing, and adjudication of the excusable 
neglect motion itself.194  The Board also denied Detroit Entertainment’s 
motion to reopen the testimony period.195 
CONCLUSION 
From the perspective of trademark law and policy, 2004 was an 
uneventful year in the Federal Circuit.  Because all of the TTAB decisions 
to reach the Federal Circuit were affirmed (with the exception of one which 
was affirmed in part and reversed in part), and because many of the 
decisions were issued in non-precedential opinions, one can conclude that 
the Federal Circuit approves of business as-usual at the PTO and the Board. 
Accordingly, practitioners should recognize the importance of taking PTO 
and Board procedures seriously, and, in the absence of a compelling 
position, should not count on an in-depth, fresh look from the Federal 
Circuit. 
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